Graduate Theses, Dissertations, and Problem Reports
2021

Mitigating Insider Threats in a Cooperative Adaptive Cruise
Control System Using Local Intra-Vehicle Data
Alexander Francis Colon
West Virginia University, afcolon@mix.wvu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/etd
Part of the Controls and Control Theory Commons, and the Other Computer Engineering Commons

Recommended Citation
Colon, Alexander Francis, "Mitigating Insider Threats in a Cooperative Adaptive Cruise Control System
Using Local Intra-Vehicle Data" (2021). Graduate Theses, Dissertations, and Problem Reports. 10241.
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/etd/10241

This Thesis is protected by copyright and/or related rights. It has been brought to you by the The Research
Repository @ WVU with permission from the rights-holder(s). You are free to use this Thesis in any way that is
permitted by the copyright and related rights legislation that applies to your use. For other uses you must obtain
permission from the rights-holder(s) directly, unless additional rights are indicated by a Creative Commons license
in the record and/ or on the work itself. This Thesis has been accepted for inclusion in WVU Graduate Theses,
Dissertations, and Problem Reports collection by an authorized administrator of The Research Repository @ WVU.
For more information, please contact researchrepository@mail.wvu.edu.

Mitigating Insider Threats in a Cooperative Adaptive Cruise
Control System Using Local Intra-Vehicle Data
Alexander Francis Colon
Thesis submitted to the Benjamin M. Statler College of Engineering and Mineral Resources
at West Virginia University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Science in Computer Science with Area of Emphasis in Cybersecurity

Brian Woerner, Ph.D., Chair
Roy Nutter, Ph.D.
Patrick Browning, Ph.D.

Lane Department of Computer Science and Electrical Engineering

Morgantown, West Virginia
2021

Keywords: CACC, V2X, Internal, Local, Security
Copyright 2021 Colon

ABSTRACT
Mitigating Insider Threats in a Cooperative Adaptive Cruise Control System Using
Local Intra-Vehicle Data

Alexander Francis Colon

With the rise of Connected-and-Automated-Vehicle (CAV) technologies on roadways,
transportation networks have become increasingly connected through Vehicle-to-Everything
(V2X) systems. With access to the additional data from V2X, modern cruise control systems like
Adaptive Cruise Control (ACC) are further improved upon to develop systems like Cooperative
ACC (CACC) which reduces traffic congestion and increases driver safety and energy efficiency.
With that increased connectivity, previously closed vehicle systems are now vulnerable to new
security threats which pose new technical challenges. Significant research has been done to
strengthen the network against external threats such as denial-of-service attacks (DoS) or passive
eavesdropping attacks using network management and cryptographic strategies. Internal threats
like data falsification are more challenging to address because they originate from already
authenticated sources on the network.
This work suggests a method to locally determine if network data can be trusted utilizing only
the intra-vehicle sensors against the network data. It functions by leveraging the synchronization
of CACC vehicle stream members to identify potentially malicious data. In the event the network
data is determined to be untrustworthy, the vehicle will change its mode of operation to basic
ACC where it will disconnect from the vehicle stream and increase the distance from the
preceding vehicle. In order to test this approach, an ACC system was created and then modified
into a simple CACC system that includes the V2X network data streams. Two common V2X
applications were used to show the functionality of both the simple CACC system and the work:
a Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I) enabled traffic light and a Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) vehicle
stream.
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1 Introduction
As transportation infrastructure continues to be modernized and more Connected and Automated Vehicle
(CAV) technologies are introduced on roadways, vehicle systems are becoming more connected than ever.
This increased connectivity between vehicles and infrastructure aims to provide ways of improving traffic
flow, energy efficiency, and driver safety. Transportation networks, or Vehicle Area Networks (VANs), are
now closer to that of computer networks as cities develop infrastructure to become “smart” cities. While
this technology does have its benefits, it comes at the cost of opening previously closed vehicle systems
to external attacks.
As is the case with computer networks, VANs are also vulnerable to cyber-attacks that can result in
instability or loss of function in the network. Instability in these networks can eliminate the benefits of
the network connectivity and in some cases cause collisions. Vehicles that rely on the positional
information from the network data will be more likely to violate their safe distance boundaries and
activate their Collision Warning or Collision Avoidance (CW/CA) systems to prevent accidents. The threats
that can impact these networks can originate from both outside and inside the VAN. Significant work has
been done to identify and manage external threats. Internal threats, however, are more difficult to
address as they come from already authenticated sources.
This paper suggests a method of using the many on-board vehicle sensors to validate the received network
data locally and provide a way for the control system to determine whether the data should be trusted
even if it originated from an already authenticated source. This idea of providing a way for the control
system to continue to function prior to violating safe distance boundaries will lead to vehicles being more
robust against abnormalities in the network data regardless of why they are present. To test this system,
the approach was designed with a rudimentary Adaptive Cruise Control (ACC) algorithm that was modified
to a simplified approach for Cooperative ACC (CACC) within Simulink. The model was tested using two
common applications in VANs: interacting with a lead vehicle in a three-member vehicle stream and a
traffic light that is transmitting data to the VAN.

1.1 Structure of the Paper
Section 2 addresses background information and relevant work covering the different aspects of CACC
including the technology and challenges associated with it.

Section 3 outlines the experimental

procedures used to develop and simulate the work proposed in this paper. Section 4 presents the
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simulation results of the experiments and discusses the takeaways from those results. Sections 5 and 6
summarize the work of the paper and reflect on areas that could use further research and development.

2 Background
2.1 Vehicle Area Networks

Figure 1: Control Vision of Vehicle Area Network [1]

Vehicle Area Networks (VANs) can be divided into four different areas as illustrated in Figure 1 above:
Intra-Vehicle communications, Vehicle-to-Broadband Cloud (V2B) communications, Vehicle-to-Vehicle
(V2V) communications, and Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I) communications [1]. Intra-Vehicle
communications include the data from the host, or ego, vehicle’s onboard sensors and hardware
transmissions. V2B communications are used to transmit ego vehicle data to cloud services. V2V
2

communications are data exchanges between the ego vehicle and another vehicle which includes safety
messages and road condition information. V2I communications are the data exchanges with roadside
technologies like crosswalks and traffic lights. V2B, V2V, and V2I communication technologies are
commonly grouped together under the term Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) communications.
V2X technology is often referred to as the next step to intelligent transportation systems as it improves
the functionality of current vehicle systems by expanding the environmental data that is available to the
vehicle [2]. With the increased perception of the environment ahead of the vehicle, systems can be
designed to be more anticipatory to changes in road conditions that would go unseen by vehicle sensors.
Applications in this area generally function using Dedicated Short-Range Communication (DSRC)
techniques that follow SAE J2735 standards [15]. These standards outline many messages but specify an
especially important message type referred to as the basic safety message. This message type contains
information about the ego vehicle’s id, position, speed, heading, etc. in Appendix A, and is constantly
broadcast to nearby receivers in other vehicles or roadside units. The data in the basic safety message
acts as the core component of many V2X applications. One such application being CACC.

2.2 Cruise Control Technologies
Cruise control systems have been around for many years and are now considered to be a standard feature
in consumer vehicles. Conventional cruise control systems regulate the acceleration of the vehicle to
maintain a driver-set speed with the goal of reducing driver fatigue. As new technologies have been
developed, cruise control systems have improved as well to meet the needs of modern consumers and
work towards accident-free roadways. ACC systems, for example, are an advanced version of cruise
control that emphasizes maintaining a safe distance from a preceding vehicle that is travelling slower than
the ego vehicle’s set speed.

Figure 2: Adaptive Cruise Control Diagram

Figure 2 illustrates this by showing the ego vehicle, in blue, slowing down to reach a safe distance and
match the slower speed of the preceding vehicle, in black. ACC systems further reduce driver fatigue by
3

eliminating the need for the driver to adjust the speed manually to prevent collisions with other vehicles,
and, in doing so, also improve driver safety, energy efficiency, and driver comfort when compared with
conventional cruise control systems. It functions using intra-vehicle ranging sensors like radar to perceive
a preceding vehicle’s speed and location relative to the ego vehicle. That information is then used to
command the ego vehicle as needed by a given situation. In the event there is no preceding vehicle
present, the system will act as a basic cruise control system would by only maintaining the driver-set
speed. Once a slower preceding vehicle appears, the system will adjust the ego vehicle’s speed to reach a
safe distance and match that vehicle’s speed automatically. ACC systems are more effective in highway
scenarios as opposed to complex urban environments due to their limited anticipatory capabilities to
sudden maneuvers from the preceding vehicle [3]. The introduction of V2X technology improves those
capabilities by extending the vehicle’s ability to get information from vehicles and roadside transmitters
ahead of the preceding vehicle. This V2X data can be used to extend ACC into CACC.

Figure 3: Cooperative Adaptive Cruise Control Vehicle Stream

CACC connects multiple vehicles together into a unit called a vehicle stream illustrated in Figure 3. A
vehicle stream consists of a single lane of vehicles with a lead vehicle in front and any number of following
vehicles as its members. This system utilizes V2V information that is transmitted between stream
members using DSRC techniques with the addition of the intra-vehicle sensor data that ACC functions on.
With the speed and positional data provided in the basic safety message, each member vehicle can match
the lead vehicle’s speed and behavior resulting in a tightly clustered group of vehicles with improved
response times to sudden events [4]. The minimized time gap between member vehicles that this system
enables maximizes road capacity, traffic flow, and studies have shown that CACC can meaningfully reduce

4

energy consumption and air pollution [5]. Additionally, CACC systems address a shortcoming of ACC by
mitigating the shock-wave effect found in congested vehicle scenarios [6].

Figure 4: Shock-wave Effect: (a) ACC System, (b) CACC System

The shock-wave effect in ACC, shown in Figure 4a, is the result of delays between the sensor data and the
system response. When the lead vehicle begins to slow down, only the vehicle directly behind it will
identify the change and begin to slow down. This braking event will then propagate to the remainder of
the vehicles over a time period. Figure 4b shows how the functionality of CACC works to mitigate that
using the data from the V2V network. In this case, the lead vehicle notifies subsequent vehicles when it
5

slows down so they can do the same which reduces the propagation delay and results in a smoother and
more efficient drive for passengers. The direction of this flow of information across the vehicle stream is
how different CACC algorithms are classified as it dictates how the vehicle stream will respond to sudden
events such as this.

Figure 5: Information Flow Topologies: (a) predecessor-following (PF), (b) predecessor-leader-following (PLF), (c) multiplepredecessor-following (MPF), (d) Bidirectional (BD), (e) PF with infrastructure sending information to leader, (f) PLF with
infrastructure sending information to leader, (g) PF with infrastructure broadcasting information [7]

The different communication flow topologies, shown in Figure 5 above, are as follows: PredecessorFollowing (PF), Predecessor-Leader-Following (PLF), Bidirectional (BD), and n-Preceding-Following. Each
communication topology has been proved to be string-stable in [8], which means any disturbances
propagated from the lead vehicle to the rest of the vehicle stream can be attenuated [9]. This paper will
only consider PLF as the CACC topology in the interest of simplicity. With this topology, information from
the lead vehicle will be transmitted to all vehicles in the vehicle stream. But string stability in real-world
environments can be impacted by both unpredictable road conditions as well as security threats.
6

2.3 Security Concerns in Cooperative Adaptive Cruise Control
The benefits of CACC are gained by achieving stability between the members of the vehicle stream. When
a vehicle stream loses its stability, the safe distance parameters of the members are likely to be violated
which can initiate the CW/CA systems to prevent a collision at the cost of driver comfort. The stability can
be deliberately disrupted by both internal and external network threats shown below.

Figure 6: Security Attacks on a CACC vehicle stream: a) falsification attack, b) eavesdropping attack, c) radio jamming attack, d)
tampering attack [10]

Figure 6 represents four possible attacks on a CACC vehicle stream. External threats like the ones
represented in Figures 6b and 6c refer to attacks from outside of the vehicle network. Figure 6b shows an
eavesdropping attack where the attacker seeks to extract information from the steam. In this case
encryption techniques are used to prevent access or anonymity techniques using group signatures [11] or
short-term certificates [12]. Figure 6c shows the effect of radio jamming or denial of service attacks on
the vehicle network. In this case, vehicles would be unable to properly form or maintain a platoon because
they would be unable to transmit or receive any data through the network, so they default to ACC
functionality. Here, researchers consider a system to detect these attacks [13] in combination with other
network countermeasures like frequency hopping to prevent the disruption. Internal threats like the ones
in Figures 6a and 6d are attacks from within the network by an already authenticated entity. These are
7

the type of attack this work focuses on addressing. Figure 6a represents a falsification or spoofing attack
where an attacker modifies components of a broadcasted message like the basic safety message or acts
as a nonexistent vehicle in the stream with the goal of disrupting the vehicle stream stability. Figure 6d
represents a compromised lead vehicle where the data to be transmitted in the basic safety messages is
altered before it is sent. There are many practical challenges to addressing internal threats due to the
scale and interpretation of what constitutes “security and privacy” [10]. Typical approaches to the
problem of trusted insiders involve some level of anomaly detection technique like the one in [14] which
requires multiple streams of data from other sources. [14] considers a compromised lead vehicle
disseminating false acceleration information which would lead to instability and potential collisions. The
authors propose an information sharing model and real-time anomaly detection mechanism that uses the
leader’s information and the information from the vehicles around the leader.

3 Methodology
This paper proposes a design methodology that locally validates network data based on the data available
from the intra-vehicle sensors to further address internal threats and reduce vehicle reliance on network
data. Two common V2X applications will be used to evaluate the effectiveness of the approach: 1)
interacting with a V2I enabled stoplight and 2) interacting with a lead vehicle in a V2V vehicle stream. The
first application is a simple implementation using different scenarios interacting with a traffic light that is
broadcasting different status information. This establishes the premise of the design methodology. The
second application considers the different speed information a lead vehicle could disseminate across a
vehicle stream and applies the design methodology in a more complex example. In order to test this
design, an ACC system needed to be developed and then modified into a simple CACC system.

3.1 Adaptive Cruise Control Model

Figure 7: ACC System

The initial control algorithm was a rudimentary ACC system developed in Simulink which is represented
in Figure 7. The system used a combination of sensor fusion data with ego vehicle information to output
8

acceleration and deceleration requests. These requests were then looped through a longitudinal vehicle
model to update dynamic vehicle information. The value of each request is determined by the distance
error and velocity error. The distance error is the difference between the relative distance from the
preceding vehicle and the calculated safe distance boundary between the two vehicles. The velocity error
is the difference between the driver selected vehicle speed and the current vehicle speed. The error values
for both distance and velocity were then input into separately tuned Proportional, Integral, Derivative
(PID) controllers to determine the best acceleration to reach zero error [16]. The velocity error would
primarily drive the acceleration requests when there is no preceding vehicle presently in view. Once a
target vehicle is recognized, the request is the minimum acceleration between the velocity and distance
error until the vehicle reaches the calculated safe distance boundary. Once the safe distance is reached,
the distance error drives acceleration requests to maintain the safe distance to the preceding vehicle.

3.1.1 ACC System: Speed Settings

Figure 8: ACC System, Speed Settings Subsystem

The Speed Settings subsystem of the ACC system enables the driver interface controls such as setting and
modifying the vehicle speed as well as toggling the ACC system. Seen in Figure 8 above, this subsystem
takes in the current speed of the ego vehicle and a control variable called ACC_Stat. ACC_Stat bundles the
driver interface functionality into a single control variable. That includes setting or adjusting value of the
set speed and turning the ACC System on or off. Once the command to set the speed has been received,
the current ego speed is captured and stored. When the system is active, the new set speed is compared
to the current ego speed and the difference is used as the speed error that is passed to the velocity PID.
Other things to note in this system are the status check to make sure ACC is currently active and the set
speed feedback loop. The status check is a redundancy that will nullify any output if the system is currently
off. The feedback loop is used to adjust the set speed to the desired level according to the current value
of ACC_Stat.
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3.1.2 ACC System: Gap Settings

Figure 9: ACC System, Gap Settings Subsystem

The Gap Settings subsystem, illustrated above, is used to calculate the safe distance from the preceding
vehicle and calculate the difference between that safe distance measure and the current distance. The
gap stat input determines which distance setting is currently used between Near-1, Medium-2, Far-3. The
gap stat input is multiplied by the speed of the ego vehicle to a time-to-impact gap value. This result is
added to a default spacing buffer to calculate the safe distance from the preceding vehicle. The difference
between the safe distance value and the relative position of the preceding vehicle is the safe distance
error used in the Distance PID.

3.1.3 ACC System: Acceleration Selection Block

Figure 10: ACC System, Acceleration Selection Subsystem

The acceleration selection subsystem determines which controller’s output will be honored by the vehicle
model. Using the ego vehicle speed, relative target speed, calculated safe distance error, and outputs of
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the two PIDs, this subsystem uses a state flow diagram to switch between each controller. Additionally,
this subsystem outputs reset logic for each PID controller.

Figure 11: ACC System, Acceleration Selection Subsystem, State Flow Diagram

Figure 11 shows the two controller states and three intermediate states in between them. The velocity
controller is the first controller because the initial goal of ACC is to maintain the driver selected speed.
This controller passes the output of the Velocity PID and outputs reset logic to the Distance PID. The reset
logic is important as it prevents a phenomenon in PID feedback controllers known as integrator windup.
Integrator windup occurs when the integrator component of the controller accumulates a significant
amount of error. The accumulation happens as a result of the absence of feedback to the Distance PID
controller since only the Velocity PID controller output is being honored by the system. This is prevented
here by resetting the accumulated error of the integrator to 0.
The state will change to one of the two transitionary states when a preceding vehicle is detected. If the
vehicle appears to be moving, the state will briefly change to the object moving state and then
immediately to the distance controller. If the vehicle appears to not be moving, the state will change to
the object stopped state where acceleration control will be dictated by the 2-D lookup table seen below.
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Distance (m)
Speed (m/s)
0
1
3
6.66
10
13.33
16.66
20
23.33
26.66
30

-1
-0.2
-0.2
-0.2
-0.3
-0.6
-0.8
-0.9
-1
-1
-1
-1

0

2

-0.07
-0.1
-0.1
-0.1
-0.4
-0.5
-0.7
-1
-1
-1
-1

0
-0.05
-0.07
-0.09
-0.1
-0.2
-0.5
-0.8
-0.9
-1
-1

5
0
0
-0.001
-0.005
-0.1
-0.15
-0.5
-0.7
-0.8
-0.9
-1

15
0
0
0
0
-0.05
-0.15
-0.4
-0.6
-0.7
-0.8
-0.9

30
0
0
0
0
0
0
-0.1
-0.3
-0.4
-0.5
-0.6

60
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
-0.1
-0.1
-0.1

Figure 12: ACC System, Acceleration Selection Subsystem, 2D Lookup Table

The two dimensions in the table are distance from the preceding vehicle on the x-axis and the speed of
the ego vehicle on the y-axis. Each of the values in the table was empirically tested based on the desired
stopping behavior of the ACC system. When the ego vehicle is going slower it won’t have to start slowing
down as quickly and can begin to stop closer to the preceding vehicle. The faster the ego vehicle is going
as it approaches the preceding vehicle, the harder the vehicle will decelerate.
In either case, once the ego vehicle reaches the safe distance boundary, the state will shift to the distance
controller and the distance PID’s requests will be honored by the system. At this point the reset logic will
be applied to the velocity PID controller as the vehicle is now operating using the distance parameter. If
the ego vehicle comes to a complete stop the state will shift to the stopped state which is a quality-of-life
addition to keep the deceleration command constant. The state will shift back to the velocity controller
once the preceding vehicle is no longer detected, or the ego vehicle reaches the set speed.

3.1.4 ACC System: System Performance
Three different scenarios were used to evaluate this ACC system’s performance: approaching a stopped
vehicle, approaching a constantly moving vehicle, and following a dynamically moving vehicle. Each
scenario generalizes a specific aspect of a full-range ACC which is a version of ACC that can bring the
vehicle to a complete stop as opposed to ACC that can only be used above 25mph. Each is illustrated in
the following figures.
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Figure 13: ACC System, Drive Cycle 1, Stopped Lead Vehicle

13

Figure 14: ACC System, Drive Cycle 2, Lead Vehicle with Constant 10m/s
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Figure 15: ACC System, Drive Cycle 3, Follow Lead Vehicle Speeding Up 10m/s then Stop

The performance of each scenario is determined using the ego speed, acceleration values, target position,
and safe distance. The first scenario depicted in Figure 13 involves the ego vehicle speeding up to its set
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speed and approaching a stopped vehicle at an initial distance of 250m. In the acceleration graph, the
output shows the ego vehicle initially accelerating to its set speed until it detects the stationary vehicle.
At this point, the acceleration control switches to the object stopped state and the ego vehicle begins to
slow down. In the second scenario, shown in Figure 14, the ego vehicle speeds up to its set speed and
encounters a vehicle moving at a constant 10m/s. The acceleration oscillation is caused by control
switching from the velocity controller to the distance controller due to the integrator component resetting
until that point. Soon after taking control, acceleration values normalize and smooth out. Figure 15 shows
the final scenario with the ego vehicle following a moving vehicle experiencing varying speeds. Control is
immediately switched to the distance controller and the ego vehicle follows at the speed varying safe
distance away. The two points of large oscillation in acceleration values are the result of instability due to
the preceding vehicle’s changing speed. This could be resolved with additional tuning of the distance
controller, but the test is still a success as the acceleration values are not too extreme.
It is worth noting that this ACC system continued to be tested and evaluated on hardware with the WVU
EcoCar team. Using an Intel Tank as the processor, this system received data from a Bosch front radar and
Intel MobilEye camera and generated acceleration requests to a MABX controller. It was then retested
once the hardware was integrated into a vehicle and functioned as expected.

3.2 Simple Cooperative Adaptive Cruise Control System Modifications
With the ACC model functioning, now V2X functionality needed to be included to enable communication
with a traffic light and additional vehicle data from a lead vehicle. To accomplish the goals of the design,
the ACC control strategy was modified into a simple CACC control strategy. It will be limited to longitudinal
controls with a single lead vehicle as the vehicle stream leader and a single preceding vehicle in between
the lead and ego vehicles. Traffic light cases do not consider edge cases where the traffic light will change
as the ego vehicle approaches the intersection. The traffic light will broadcast positional information and
light status information: Green-1, Yellow-2, Red-3. The lead vehicle will broadcast positional and speed
information. With these changes, the algorithm will instead use the V2X broadcasted information as
opposed to the intra-vehicle sensor data until specific criteria are violated. Like the response to jammed
network data discussed earlier, the system will default to ACC functionality if no network data is present.
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Figure 16: Simple CACC System

Depicted above in Figure 16 is the simple CACC system used for testing this security application. Designed
on top of the existing ACC system, the key changes highlighted are the inclusion of additional data streams
representing the broadcasted V2X information as well as a data selector block that can switch between
ACC and CACC control strategies as needed. Along with these additions, existing blocks in the ACC system
were modified to accommodate the extended functionality.
V2I traffic light data was simulated in a similar way to a static preceding vehicle. It broadcasts a distance
from the ego vehicle along with a status indicator to specify the current traffic light status. In addition to
the broadcasted V2I data, a camera sensor input was simulated using positional data to imitate the shorter
detection range of the camera. V2V lead vehicle data was simulated using a combination of the preceding
vehicle’s dynamics and the adjusted ego vehicle’s speed. The result is lead vehicle data for a vehicle in
front of the preceding member vehicle that is traveling at the same speed as the ego vehicle. Both inputs
are used to define the time gap between the three vehicles.
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3.2.1 CACC System: Data Selector

Figure 17: Simple CACC System, Data Selector Subsystem

The Data Selector subsystem was designed to check for the presence of data from the V2I and V2V data
streams. It accomplishes this using an if-elseif-else block that checks each input for a nonzero value where
it will determine the mode of operation: ACC Functionality-1, Traffic Light-2, CACC Functionality-3. Once
that is determined, the switch will select the appropriate dataset to pass downstream to the remainder
of the system. The mode of operation is also output to control additional variables in later subsystems. In
addition to the data selector block, subsystems downstream needed to be modified to accommodate the
new functionality.

3.2.2 CACC System: V2I Traffic Light Modifications

Figure 18: Simple CACC System, Acceleration Selection, State Flow Diagram, Modified

The traffic light functionality required modifications in both the acceleration selection subsystem state
flow chart and the gap settings subsystem. The state flow diagram in the Acceleration Selection
subsystem, shown in Figure 18, was adjusted to allow the system to stop the ego vehicle or continue
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based on the status of the light. An additional requirement was included to keep the velocity controller in
control of the ego vehicle in the event the light status reads Green-1. If it is not green, then the ego vehicle
needs to switch to the lookup table and distance controllers to stop the vehicle smoothly before the
intersection is reached.

Figure 19: Simple CACC System, Gap Settings Subsystem, Modified for V2I

In the Gap Settings subsystem, shown above, a new block was created to switch between default spacing
values to ensure the vehicle stops with an appropriate distance from the object based on the current
mode of operation. In the case of the traffic light, the ego vehicle should stop at the intersection as
opposed to the default spacing defined in the ACC algorithm, so traffic light functionality requires a default
spacing of zero.

3.2.3 CACC System: V2V Vehicle Stream Modifications

Figure 20: Simple CACC System, Data Selector Subsystem, Modified
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Figure 21: Simple CACC System, Gap Settings Subsystem, Modified for V2V

To enable V2V vehicle stream functionality, the lead vehicle’s data was converted to a time gap to be
passed to the Gap Settings subsystem. The time gap is input into the distance controller with the preceding
vehicle’s position data. An additional default spacing setting for CACC was also added to the spacing
selector. In terms of the Acceleration Selection subsystem, only the distance controller was used to
maintain the time gap between vehicles. A second state flow chart was created to simplify the design.
Functionally, the vehicle is solely controlled by the distance controller to maintain the time gap.

3.2.4 CACC System: System Performance

Figure 22: Simple CACC System, Traffic Light Scenario
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Figure 23: Simple CACC System, Traffic Light Performance – RED

Figure 24: Simple CACC System, Traffic Light Performance – GREEN

Figure 23 shows the ego vehicle’s performance when encountering a red traffic light. At approximately 30
seconds into the run the ego vehicle applies the brakes to slow the vehicle down as it reaches the
intersection. Conversely in Figure 24, the green traffic light case, the ego vehicle maintains its set speed
and drives through the light without issue. This functionality will be important in explaining the basic
premise behind this strategy of managing internal threats. Interacting with traffic lights include a limited
number of cases when excluding outside factors like other vehicles or edge cases.
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Figure 25: Simple CACC System, V2V Vehicle Stream Scenario

Figure 26: Simple CACC System, V2V Vehicle Stream Performance, Speeding Up 10m/s then Stop

Figure 27: Simple CACC System, V2V Vehicle Stream Performance, Speeding Up 20m/s then Stop
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Both Figures 26 and 27 show the effects the lead time gap has on the spacing between each vehicle. This
is CACC in action. As the Lead vehicle slows down, the time gap will reduce, and the vehicles will get closer
together. If the lead vehicle accelerates, the time gap will increase, and the vehicles will have more space
between them. In the event the vehicles get too close and violate an arbitrary constant distance
parameter of 2m, the system will enter CA/CW and disable the CACC system. It is a redundancy built into
other CACC systems, so it was included. The oscillation seen in Figure 27 seems to be the combined result
of the distance controller not being tuned for CACC functionality and sensitivity to high speed changes.

3.3 Identifying Erroneous Data

Figure 28: Simple CACC System with Data Validation

Now, with a semi functioning CACC system to use for testing, the proposed method for further addressing
internal security vulnerabilities could be included. This was implemented into the data selector block, as
shown in Figure 28, where the data from each stream can be used for validation. In addition to the range
finding intra-vehicle sensors, this approach also assumes to have the use of camera technologies that can
detect traffic lights and their statuses like that of the MobilEye camera system.
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Figure 29: Data Validation

To implement this method, data inputs were compared with a 5m/s tolerance of error of between values.
In the case of the V2V vehicle stream, the positional and speed data from the broadcasted safety message
for both the lead and preceding vehicles were compared against the intra-vehicle sensor inputs based on
sensor observations of the preceding vehicle. If the data was relatively close, the system would proceed
normally as a CACC system. Alternatively, if there is a larger discrepancy in the values, the system would
then operate as an ACC system. In the case of the V2I enabled traffic light, the broadcasted positional and
status information is compared against the camera detection values to determine light status accuracy. If
the camera is not in range of the traffic light, the system can only use the network data available.
This design method leverages the synchronization between vehicles in an active vehicle stream to detect
irregularities in transmitted data using intra-vehicle sensor data. In the event the lead vehicle is
broadcasting information that differs from the observed behavior of the preceding vehicle, the system
can flag that as an anomaly regardless of why it is present. Whether it is falsified or erroneous data, once
the anomaly is detected, the system can preemptively change the control strategy to ACC. This would
result in more distance from the preceding vehicle, improve driver safety, and maintain driver comfort as
it avoids instability in the stream. This system behavior also mimics human behavior in terms of creating
more distance between vehicles in uncertain situations and environments.

4 Simulation Results
In order to test the functionality of the proposed method, different scenarios are considered within the
two test applications. These scenarios will have varying degrees of potential consequences, however, if
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the system prevents them from occurring by either switching to ACC control or continuing normal CACC
functionality, it will be deemed a success. The first application, the V2I traffic light, will be used to explain
the simple operation of the design method: the ego vehicle either will or will not stop for the light based
on the perceivable data. The second, the V2V vehicle stream, will be applied in a more complex
application. The ego vehicle’s behavior will be more subtle here than in the traffic light scenarios.

4.1 Application 1: V2I Traffic Light Simulation Results

Figure 30: Application 1, V2I Enabled Traffic Light

Several different scenarios can take place when interacting with a potentially malicious V2I enabled
stoplight.
Test Light
Num Status
1
Green

Network
Status
Green

If Ego Trusts Network Information

2

Green

Red

Vehicle brakes for light
- Driver could disengage and
proceed
- Possible accident if rear vehicle
isn’t paying attention

3

Red

Red

Vehicle brakes for light

4

Red

Green

Vehicle drives through intersection
- High likelihood of accident

5

Fake
Roadside
– No Light

Red

Acts as if light is present

Vehicle continues driving normally

Figure 31: Application 1, V2I Enabled Traffic Light Scenario Table
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If Ego Does Not Trust
Network Information
Would trust once light is in
range
Vehicle identifies green light
and proceeds normally

Would trust once light is in
range
Vehicle identifies red light
and stops at intersection
Identifies the absence of the
light and ignores

Figure 32: Traffic Light Application Performance, Test 1, Network-GREEN Sensor-GREEN

Figure 33: Traffic Light Application Performance, Test 2, Network-RED Sensor-GREEN
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Figure 34: Traffic Light Application Performance, Test 3, Network-RED Sensor-RED

Figure 35: Traffic Light Application Performance, Test 4, Network-GREEN Sensor-RED
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Figure 36: Traffic Light Application Performance, Test 5, Network-RED Sensor-NO LIGHT

4.2 Application 1: V2I Traffic Light Simulation Discussion
In the V2I traffic light application, shown in Figures 32 to 36, each test shows the system’s performance
in a simpler application. This application’s possible outcomes are evident in whether the ego vehicle stops
at the light or not. Without the local verification system, the ego vehicle would rely on the network data
which could potentially be spoofed or altered. Once the ego vehicle gets in range of the traffic light for
the camera sensor to read the light status, that data output is used over the network data if they are
unequal. This is shown in the right graph of each figure where Light Out, the data that is used to make
decisions, changes depending on whether Light Sensor agrees with Light Data. In tests 1 and 3 where the
network data agrees with the sensor, no change is needed, and the network data continues to be used to
control the ego vehicle. In other test cases, tests 2 and 4, the check prevents the ego vehicle from either
running through the traffic light when its red or stopping at a green light. In either case, it could prevent
a potentially dangerous situation and protect the driver. In the case where no light was present, the
system initially operated normally until the vehicle was within range for the sensor to detect a light. Once
it recognized that no traffic light was present, the vehicle continued normally.
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4.3 Application 2: V2V CACC Vehicle Stream Simulation Results

Figure 37: Application 2, V2V Vehicle Stream

Test Lead Vehicle
Num Broadcast Speed
1
Matches
Preceding

If Ego Trusts Network Information

2

Faster

Time gap would increase which would
cause the ego vehicle to slow compared
to the preceding member vehicle
- Unstable vehicle stream
- Wasted efficiency

3

Slower

Time gap would decrease which would
cause ego vehicle to get closer to the
preceding vehicle
- Unstable vehicle stream
- Unsafe
- Wasted efficiency
- Lack of driver comfort

Vehicle maintains lead specified time
gap from preceding vehicle

Figure 38: Application 2, V2V Vehicle Stream Scenario Table
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If Ego Does Not Trust Network
Information
Would trust
Disengage from vehicle stream
and switch to ACC functionality
- Increase distance from
preceding vehicle
- Could join or lead
another CACC stream
Disengage from vehicle stream
and switch to ACC functionality
- Increase distance from
preceding vehicle
- Could join or lead
another CACC stream

Figure 39: Vehicle Stream Application Performance, Test 1, With Validation

Figure 40: Vehicle Stream Application Performance, Test 2, No Validation
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Figure 41: Vehicle Stream Application Performance, Test 2, With Validation

Figure 42: Vehicle Stream Application Performance, Test 3, No Validation
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Figure 43: Vehicle Stream Application Performance, Test 3, With Validation

4.4 Application 2: V2V CACC Vehicle Stream Simulation Discussion
The vehicle stream application performance is slightly more nuanced in function compared to the traffic
light, but the same principle is applied. Unlike the traffic light application where the light is either red or
green, here, a threshold is used to determine whether the ego vehicle should switch function to ACC
control. For testing purposes, a threshold of 5m was chosen. This can be seen in tests 2 and 3, shown in
Figures 40 to 43, where the lead vehicle is transmitting a speed greater or less than that of the preceding
vehicle, and control switches to ACC. Also observed is that in each case, the ego vehicle increases the safe
distance from the preceding vehicle according to the differences in gap settings between the two systems.
Once the threshold is met and the switch takes place, the ego vehicle brakes to increase the gap from the
preceding vehicle before reaching the new safe distance and rematching the preceding vehicle’s speed.
The significant oscillation observed in Figure 42 is a consequence of the way lead data is represented with
the PID controller. Halving the lead data for this case results in halving the feedback the Distance PID
controller receives as input. As such, it takes twice as long for the Distance PID to smooth out the response.

4.5 System Review
Overall, the method of identifying error in the data streams and proactively switching function back to
ACC proved to be successful. The idea leverages the synchronization between members of a vehicle
stream to locally determine if the data from the lead vehicle is to be trusted. If the lead vehicle transmits
data that does not agree with the observable vehicle dynamics past a threshold, then the ego vehicle
should disconnect from the vehicle stream for the sake of safety and driver comfort. The decision to switch
the vehicle back to ACC functionality is not negative. As with other fail cases within CACC, if something
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goes wrong with the network data, the system should default back to ACC functionality. This approach
extends that to include a preemptive switch to protect against forms of internal threats like spoofing or
data falsification.
Proactively disconnecting from a potentially malicious lead vehicle will enable the vehicle to resume CACC
functionality through joining another available CACC vehicle stream behind a different leader or start its
own vehicle stream. This method used in conjunction with other methods such as cloud-based trust
certificates using vehicle IDs could effectively mitigate risks brought about through internal threats.

5 Conclusions
As new CAV technologies are researched and developed, transportation VANs are becoming more
connected than ever. Using technologies like V2I and V2V, new data streams enable vehicle systems that
produce less congestion on roadways, more energy efficiency, and improved driver safety. However,
those new data streams also open previously closed vehicle systems to external attacks. Attacks towards
the VAN can cause instability or loss of function in the network which eliminates the benefits of the
connectivity. In applications like CACC where the distance between vehicles is minimized, instability could
cause member vehicles to violate their safe distance boundaries and activate their CW/CA systems to
prevent a collision. These attacks can originate from external or internal sources. Significant work has
been done to address the different external threats posed to the network. Internal threats are more
challenging to address because they originate from already authenticated sources.
This paper suggests a method to further address internal threats by using the many on-board vehicle
sensors to validate the received network data locally. The goal is to provide an additional way for the
control system to determine whether the data should be used even it originated from an authenticated
source. This way, the control system can continue to function without violating safe distance boundaries
and will lead to vehicles being more robust against abnormalities present in the network regardless of the
reason. Combined with other work in this area such as ID flagging identified malicious vehicles, this system
can mitigate internal threats on the VAN while maintaining driver safety and driver comfort.

6 Future Work
Due to the limitations put on the design by only considering general longitudinal cases, the validation
methodology could be further refined when considering lateral cases as well. CACC systems include
functionality that enables vehicles outside of the vehicle stream to merge into and join in the middle of
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the stream. This is an example of a set of cases where the threshold requirements would need to be
modified to account for this case. Here, the synchronization across the member vehicles is sacrificed to
allow the external vehicle to join the stream. Other edge cases could also be considered to further refine
the methodology.
Another potential area of focus is considering the impact of noise from hardware on the data. The
different control parameters could be reevaluated to account for noise or other accuracies within the
intra-vehicle sensor data when determining if the data from the network is accurate.
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8 Appendix
Appendix A: Basic Safety Message Major Attributes
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Temporary ID
Time
Latitude
Longitude
Elevation
Positional Accuracy
Speed and Transmission
Heading
Acceleration
Steering Wheel Angle
Brake System Status
Vehicle Size

Appendix B: Simulink Model
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Figure B-1: Top Level System

Figure B-2: Mode Selector Subsystem

Figure B-3: Gap Settings Subsystem
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Figure B-4: Speed Settings Subsystem

Figure B-5: Acceleration Selection Subsystem
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